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POINT &COUNTERPOINT
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
By Deborah A. Geie~ and Maxine Aaronson

A

scrlcs of recent and contro
versial cases has raised the
b~uc nf hnw plaintiffs tnust
treat attnrnc.y fees and
costs that arc paid om of
otherwise indudable set
tlement or litigation awards.
Point: Only Congress can cre
ate deductions. In these cases,
plaintiffs contended thm the ponion
of the award paid to the attorneys is
"cxdudahlc" hy rhem in the first
place. The plaintiffs made three
argurncnrs, the first two of which
can he raised only if the contract
wilh the allomcy L~ of a contlngcm
fcc nature. First, plaintiffs argue that
they have assignrd rhcir property
rights to a portion of the recovery
equal to their attornq lees and
costs because they gave up control
over that portion of their recovery
under the comingem fee comract.
Second, they argue that the Old

''

gross-income doctrine docs not fit
the problem at hand and can allow
inappropriate "deduction" of nonde
ductible capital cxpenditurrs.
One rejoinder deals \\~th the only
argument that would apply equally
to contingent-fee contmcts and
other hourly contmw;: the existence
of swte attornr>' lien &tatmcs. What
about p:1ymcnts to allorncys in
states in which 1herc is no simihu
statute or in which the stat\llc cre
ates for the attorneys only a security
interest in the reco\•ery? Most del'en
dants pay contingent-fee awards
directly to the nust account of the
plaintiffS attomcys, so the statute
has little effect other than to make
some plaintiffs pay tax on gross
a\wrds while others pay tax on onl}'
the net awanls.
With respect lo the arguments
applicable only in the cases Involving
contingent-fee contracts, what about

The court concluded that this method of repayment
places taxpayer's funds at risk.

fees paid under the occasional
hourly or llat-ratc contract? It should
make no difference how the fee pay
ment is strncmred; t11e fees should
be fully deductible in any event.
With respect to contingent-fee con
tracts themselves, it is not cll'ar !hat
they opcr.llc to "assiJln" a portion of
assignable "property" income, or that
plaintiffs have no obligation to "pay"
the attorneys under a contingent-fee
contract. It is just as reasonable to
argue that the relutionship bc1wcc11
Oebomlt A. Geier Is alaw professor at the parties is that of senice red pient
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, to scn~cc provider, and that \he
Clet'eland, Ohio. Maxine Aaronson is a plaintiffs simply a!\recd to mc:isure
solo praclftioner In Dallas, Texas. the worth of their attorneys' services

Colony TillSt doctrine does not
apply because, under the contin
gent-fee contract, plaintiffs had no
obligotion to po}' the mtomcys for
their services. Third, they argue
that, becnuse attorney lien statutes
can give the :morncys a p1ior right
to the portion of any recovery equal
to fees and costs owed to them, the
attomers "own" this ponlon of the
award from the beginning.
The rejoinders illustmte thm the

62

by reference to the gross rccovety
under the lmvsuil.
The fact that the. assignment-of.
income cases arose in the family con
text, and that only the donor or
donec, but not both, were taxed does
not mean th~n attempted "assign
me111s" of income should hr. ll'$pect
ed oUlside those contexts. Sometimes
both should be taxed, and taxation of
rhc assignor should not be allowed to
be evaded hy disthigulshing away the
:L'\5ignmcm-of-lncomc doctrine. This
point is illustrntcd in llayli11 v. IJ11ltecl
S1<1tcs, which dc111onstmtcs that ii
might m)t be <I good idea In allow ull
litigants to exclude the portion of an
av.-ard equal to the amount paid to I.he
attorneys under any of these theories.
In !Joyll11, a pmtnership chal
lenged a $4 million valuation of
property seized by the stntc under
its condcmm1tion power. The part
nership entered into a contingent
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fee contract under which its attor
ney would receive a percentage of
any increase obtained over the pre
vious valuation. The purtics settled
i1t a valuation of more than $16 mil
lion. The fee, if nor excludablc h>•
the partnership, would not be ron
sidered a deductible e:.:pense but,
rather, a nondeductible capital
expenditure pertaining to the con
demned property, reducing the
amount of c11pital gain realized by
the partnership. The courl n•jcctrd
:m exclusion, rnnduding that the
assignment-of-income doctrine pre·

(Continued on page 84)

vents it and thlll the presence of an
not change
the t't'_~ull.
The ca;c demonstrates why this
b'tll' is properly t1 deduction issue,
and tlrnt relief for the appropriate
r:1scs slrnuld he lcgisbtcd on the
d1:<luc:Lion side of the ledger. Trying
10 resolve the problem favorably for
1he sympathetic class in this manner
rnn wreak havnc in a case such <1S
Bayli11, when: 1he ta.xp:iycr would
effectively be allowc:tl 10 deduct a
nonclccluctiblc capital elqJcnditurc.
Counterpoint: let's not forget
the forest while examining the
trees. Virtually no one actually
bt'.licves that it is approp1ia1e or
good tax policy lo fail lo allow some
sort ul c:rcdit for mtorncy fees
against 1hc alt~rrnllive minimum tax
(A\>IT). My favorite illustrath•e case
is Farnglwr \~ City of Born Raw11,
whic:h was a sexual harnss111cnt CH5C
al 1ornc;• lien stotute does

clarilying that employers Giil be \ic
ariously liable for 1hc actions of their
employees. Plairniff was awarded
one dollar in actual damages and
recovered her allurncy fees, which
reportedly nm some $325,000.
Does anyone rrally think that Ms.
F:1mghar should bl'. prMlcged to pay
more rhan $80,000 in taxes out of
her own pocket for having the
courage to pursue what was dearly
unple:is.1nt, b1.1t important, litiga
tion?
The AMT was otiginally passed
to deal with a small number of very
wealthy indi,,iduals who were 1x1y
ing little or no t:~x. Disalklwing any
offset or a\low:.utcc for attonwy fw;
simply docs not bit the "target mar
ket" of the AMT. lns1cad, il penalizes
mitldlc-cbss taxpayers who collect
taxable. damages for oncc-1ri-.1-lifc
time events as recompense for an
occurrence that most taxpayers
wnuld just as soon not repe<tt,
regdrcllcss of the net economic gain.
II the purpose ol tlie /\MT f.o; to influ
ence the behavior of taxpayers who
1.1se certain deductions on u recur
ring basis, then the position of the
IRS pcni11i1cs the innocent while
missing the real target. The debate is
about what to do aboul it, and who
can do it. Professor Gt:ier believes
that the solution must come from
Congress I: ~cause she ;iews the
issue as a deduction issue. Clearly.
her solution is one wily to solve the
problem. But is it the only way?
Some couns take the view that the
attorney fee ponic.n is never the
incnmc of the litig;inr to begin with.
Therefore, it is not includablc under
§ 61, and a rorrcsponcling offacuing
deduction is not necessary The fact
that this theory nearly s1dcs1eps the
mismatch of mcomc and expense
under the AMT is not a reason to
discMd it, if it is othcrwf;c justifi
able.
Stt')1ping back from the specific
problem and analyzini; the "eco
nomic deal" between the pilrtlcs is
often uscfol in tax matters, where
substance trittmph5 over form.
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What lhcn 1,; the economic deal
between lawyer and c.licnt in a trndi
tional contingency fee arrangement?
At its most basic. a 1raditi01ml con
tingency fee arrangement is a trans
fer of an economic interest in the
end product in cxc:hangc for scn~ces
necessary to prnducc ihc encl result..
On what theory should one party
have 10 rcporl as p;ross income 100
percent of the product, and the occ
ond pmty report a portion as well?
Section 61 defines income broadly,
but no su broad.ly as to include pick
ing up the income or anot her.
A typical attorney contingency
fee contrnct tnmsfcrs 1111 interest m
prnp1~r1 y if considerntion is present.
The mlornrys lien i:,;.~ue is a red her
rinf!,. as is the argu1ncnt that the
attorney c:mrwt pwcccd wit hnm 1hr.
client's consent. Tlw rules in this
area exist to avoid the common law
crime or b.irralry, not to determine
and guide the tax consequences of
the transaction. The reality is no dif
ferent from that involving the shnrc
croppcr. rommcrcial fisherman,
vcmling machi11c 0\\11rr, or mineral
lease. Neither party can proceed
withom something from the other-
and that is the essence of a joint ven
ture. which may or may not he a
"partnership" for t:Lx purposes.
Fmally, the issue of bring able to
somehow drduct a nondeductible
capital expense rniscd by Professor
Geier should be addressed.
Damages for destmclion of capital
assets arc capital in n;iturc. Under
the origin of the claim thco1y, a
deemed sulc or exchange occurs and
the capitalized expense is taken into
acrnunt at the timl' of payment.
C1pitalizccl expenses arc, in rlfrct,
netted out at the time of disposition
of the capital asset. The underl>ing
litigation in Daylln was a condcmna·
tion case. Sculcmcnt of the matter,
whrtlw.r at the rnunhouse nr hernrc
trial, dfecled ei1h~r a partial or com
plete disposition of the ::lSSel, since
the settlement fixed the amount
realized in exchange for the proper
ty taken.
in:rJ11
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